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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 The City of Englewood, New Jersey, appeals the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a 
plaintiff who claimed that an ordinance the City enacted to 
create a buffer zone around clinics where abortions are 
performed violated her freedom of speech, association, and 
assembly.  Because we conclude that there are genuine issues 
of material fact precluding the entry of summary judgment to 
either side, we will reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 In March 2014, the City Council of Englewood 
amended its ordinances to address aggressive antiabortion 
protests that had been regularly occurring outside of 
Metropolitan Medical Associates (“MMA” or “the clinic”)—a 
health clinic that provided reproductive health services, 
including abortions, to women.1 We will discuss the incidents 
at MMA in more detail below, but at the outset, it is important 
                                              
1 The facts included in this preliminary recitation are 
undisputed by the parties.  
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to note that this dispute arises against a background that 
included “militant activists and aggressive protestors” 
beginning to gather outside of the facility in late 2013.2 Many 
of these protestors were associated with an evangelical 
ministry called the Bread of Life. The Bread of Life had ties to 
other radical antiabortion organizations including those which 
support violent reprisal against abortion providers. The Bread 
of Life protestors engaged in extremely aggressive, loud, 
intimidating, and harassing behavior towards patients, their 
companions, and even other groups whose views generally 
aligned with the Bread of Life’s antiabortion position. 
The new ordinance read: 
A. Definitions. As used in this 
section, the following terms shall 
have the meanings indicated: 
 
1. “Health care facility” — as 
set forth in N.J.S.A. 26:2H 2. 
2. “Transitional facility” — 
Community residences for 
the developmentally disabled 
and community shelters for 
victims of domestic violence 
as those terms are defined in 
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-66.2. 
 
B. Within the City of Englewood, no 
person shall knowingly enter or 
remain on a public way or 
sidewalk adjacent to a health care 
facility or transitional facility 
within a radius of eight feet of any 
portion of an entrance, exit or 
driveway of such facility or within 
the area within a rectangle created 
by extending the outside 
boundaries of any entrance, exit or 
driveway of such facility in 
straight lines to the point where 
such lines intersect the sideline of 
the street in front of such entrance, 
                                              
2 JA 428. 
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exit or driveway. This subsection 
shall not apply to the following 
  
1. persons entering or leaving 
such facility; 
 
2. employees or agents of 
such facility acting within the 
scope of their employment  
 
3. law enforcement, 
ambulance, firefighting, 
construction, utilities, public 
works and other municipal 
agents acting within the 
scope of their employment; 
and  
4. persons using the public 
sidewalk or street right of 
way adjacent to such facility 
solely for the purpose of 
reaching a destination other 
than such facility  
  
C. The provisions of subsection B 
shall only take effect during such 
facility’s business hours and if the 
area contained within the radius 
and rectangle described in said 
subsection B is clearly marked and 
posted. 
 
The practical effect of the ordinance was the creation of 
three overlapping buffer zones at any qualifying facility. Two 
semicircular buffer zones extended outwards eight feet from 
either side of the facility’s entrance. The third buffer zone 
spanned the width of the facility’s entrance and extended to the 
street. A picture of the buffer zones (shown in yellow) is set 
forth below: 
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 Prior to enacting the disputed ordinance, the City had 
increased police patrols on mornings when it anticipated Bread 
of Life protestors would be present.3 Police officers present on 
the scene imposed informal “no go zones” where protestors 
could not stand.   Those zones were similar to the buffer zones 
that were part of the Ordinance.  Although the police presence 
temporarily eased tensions at MMA, the hostile protests and 
resulting problems resumed immediately after officers left the 
clinic.  
 
 Plaintiff/Appellee Jeryl Turco was not one of the hostile 
or aggressive anti-abortion protestors.  Rather, she refers to 
herself as a “sidewalk counselor.” It is undisputed that, unlike 
the violent and aggressive anti-abortion protestors affiliated 
with groups such as Bread of Life, her practice was to calmly 
approach women entering the clinic and attempt to engage in 
peaceful, nonconfrontational communication. She believes 
that such conversational interaction is far more effective than 
the tactics favored by the aggressive protestors.  In addition, 
Turco routinely offered rosaries and literature about prenatal 
care to patients entering the clinic.  She also invited the women 
to accompany her to a crisis pregnancy center across the street, 
and often attempted to reassure the women by telling them 
                                              
3 The Bread of Life protestors generally gathered on Saturday 
mornings. 
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things such as: “we can help you” and “we are praying for 
you.” 
 
 Turco brought this action against the City of Englewood 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enjoin enforcement of the 
Ordinance because she believed that it hampered her efforts to 
provide counseling.  She alleged that the Ordinance violated 
her First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, assembly, 
and association. She sought a declaration that the Ordinance 
was unconstitutional on its face and as applied and sought to 
enjoin its enforcement.   
 
The District Court held the motion in abeyance until we 
decided Bruni v. Pittsburgh,4 a case involving a similar 
ordinance in the City of Pittsburgh that was then pending in our 
court.  After we decided Bruni, Turco elected not to renew her 
motion for a preliminary injunction, and the parties proceeded 
to discovery. Upon completion of discovery, the District Court 
granted Turco’s cross-motion for summary judgment.5 
  
The District Court concluded that the statute was 
overbroad and not narrowly tailored to serve the government’s 
interest.  In explaining why it believed the Ordinance was 
overbroad, the Court explained that the City “did not create a 
targeted statute to address the specific issue of congestion or 
militant and aggressive protestors outside of the Clinic.”6 
Rather, it found that the City had “created a sweeping 
regulation that burdens the free speech of individuals, not just 
in front of the Clinic, but at health care and transitional 
facilities citywide.”7  
 
Perhaps somewhat understandably, the District Court’s 
overbreadth analysis overlapped considerably with its narrow 
tailoring analysis.8 The District Court found that the statute 
                                              
4 824 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2016). 
5 Turco v. City of Englewood, No. 2:15-cv-03008, 2017 WL 
5479509, at *1 (D. N.J. Nov. 14, 2017).  
6 Id. at *4. 
7 Id.  
8 See id. (addressing the “narrowly-tailored requirement” in 
the overbreadth analysis section). 
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was not narrowly tailored because the City failed to 
demonstrate that it had “employ[ed] alternative, less restrictive 
means” of addressing the hostile protestors on the clinic’s 
sidewalk.9 Instead, the Court found, the City had “put[] forth 
speculative assertions that it tried and/or seriously considered 
less restrictive alternatives, such as increased police presence 
[or] injunctive relief, prior to adoption of the amended 
Ordinance.”10 Accordingly, the Court granted Turco’s motion 
for summary judgment, and this appeal followed. 
 
 II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 
review appeals from the grant of summary judgment de novo.11 
We apply the same test as the district court: viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
we ask whether there is any genuine issue of material fact.12 
“The mere existence of some evidence in support of the 
nonmovant is insufficient to deny a motion for summary 
judgment; enough evidence must exist to enable a jury to 
reasonably find for the nonmovant on the issue.”13 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
We analyze § 1983 lawsuits that allege a First 
Amendment violation using a three-part test.14 First, we 
determine whether the First Amendment protects the speech at 
issue.15 Next, we consider the “nature of the forum.”16 Finally, 
we resolve “whether the [government’s] justifications for 
                                              
9 Id. at *5. 
10 Id. 
11 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 
915, 925 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
12 Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
13 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Giles v. 
Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
14 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 
473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
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exclusion from the relevant forum satisfy the requisite 
standard.”17  
 
Only the third prong of the test is at issue in this appeal. 
The City concedes that the First Amendment fully protects the 
speech at issue here and that the Ordinance clearly regulates 
speech in a traditional public forum (i.e., the sidewalk).18 The 
parties also agree—as do we—that the restrictions imposed are 
content-neutral because they regulate “the total quantity of 
speech by regulating the time, the place or the manner in which 
one can speak . . . .”19 The Ordinance impacts the speech of 
those who support abortion as well as those who oppose it; it 
is clearly content neutral.20  We therefore apply intermediate 
scrutiny.21  Accordingly, to withstand constitutional scrutiny, 
                                              
17 Id. 
18 See Turco, 2017 WL 5479509, at * 4 (noting that 
Englewood did “not challenge the fact that the speech at issue 
is protected under the First Amendment, or that its Ordinance 
suppresse[d] speech in a traditional forum”). Indeed, public 
streets and sidewalks are the “quintessential public forum” 
and occupy a “special position in terms of First Amendment 
protection.” Bruni, 824 F.3d at 366 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). When the government imposes 
restrictions on communication in these areas, “it imposes an 
especially significant First Amendment burden.” Id. (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  
19 Rappa v. New Castle Cnty., 18 F.3d 1043, 1053–54 (3d Cir. 
1994) (citations omitted).  
20 See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 485 (2014). As 
explained in depth below, McCullen considered a 
legislatively enacted buffer zone similar to the one enacted 
here. The Supreme Court concluded that such enactments 
were “neither content nor viewpoint based and therefore need 
not be analyzed under strict scrutiny.” Id. In light of this 
authority and the parties’ agreement that we should apply 
intermediate scrutiny, we need not discuss the appropriate 
level of scrutiny in detail.  
21 Id. at 485–86. 
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the Ordinance must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest.”22 
 
This “tailoring requirement does not simply guard 
against an impermissible desire to censor.”23 Rather, “by 
demanding a close fit between ends and means,” the narrow 
tailoring requirement prevents the suppression of speech “for 
mere convenience.”24 For a content neutral speech 
restriction—such as the Ordinance—“to be narrowly tailored, 
it must not ‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary 
to further the government’s legitimate interests.’”25 Unlike a 
content-based speech restriction, the Ordinance “‘need not be 
the least restrictive or least intrusive means of’ serving the 
government’s interests.”26 Rather, the First Amendment 
prohibits the government from regulating speech in a way that 
would allow a substantial burden on speech to fall in an area 
that “does not serve to advance its goals.”27 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in McCullen v. Coakley 
offers a useful starting point for our analysis. There, the 
Massachusetts legislature amended its Reproductive Health 
Care Facilities Act to address protests outside of abortion 
clinics. The amended Act made it a crime to knowingly stand 
on a “public way or sidewalk” within thirty-five feet of the 
entrance or driveway to any facility where abortions were 
performed.28 In nearly all material respects, the amended Act 
was identical to the Ordinance before us, except the 
Massachusetts law established a thirty-five foot buffer zone 
and the Ordinance establishes an eight-foot buffer zone. This 
is a substantial distinction that the District Court did not 
                                              
22 Bruni, 824 F.3d at 363–64 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 
U.S. 753, 764 (1994)).  
23 McCullen, 573 U.S. at 486. 
24 Id.  
25 Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 
799 (1989)). 
26 Id. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 798)). 
27 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ward, 491 
U.S. at 799)). 
28 Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 266 § 120E½ (2012).     
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adequately discuss in relying upon McCullen to support its 
order granting summary judgment to Turco.29 Nor did the 
District Court fully appreciate the difference between the 
presence of demonstrable alternatives in McCullen and the 
evidence on this record that explains why less restrictive means 
were not likely to serve the City’s interests here. 
 
In McCullen, a sidewalk counselor (McCullen), sued to 
enjoin enforcement of a Massachusetts statute that made it a 
crime to stand within thirty-five feet of the entrance of any 
place where abortions were performed. Following a trial based 
on a stipulated record, the district court denied her challenge, 
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
 
After concluding that the Act was a content-neutral 
restriction on speech in a traditional public forum (sidewalks), 
the Court declared the statute unconstitutional. The Court’s 
holding was based on the fact that “[t]he buffer zones burden 
substantially more speech than necessary to achieve 
[Massachusetts’s] asserted interest[].”30 The Court began its 
narrow-tailoring analysis by identifying the interests at stake. 
It noted that the buffer zones “clearly serve” the “government 
interests in ‘ensuring public safety and order, promoting the 
free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks, protecting 
property rights, and protecting a woman’s freedom to seek 
pregnancy-related services.’”31  
But the zones also placed “serious burdens” on the 
counselors’ speech interests.32  The thirty-five foot buffer 
zones resulted in a heavy burden on “one-on-one 
communication,” which is the sidewalk counselors’ preferred 
                                              
29 See Turco, 2017 WL 5479509, at *5 n.3 (noting only that 
“the size of the buffer zone is not dispositive because 
[Englewood] has failed to meet its burden and show that the 
Ordinance is narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate 
governmental interest”). 
30 McCullen, 573 U.S. at 490. 
31 Id. at 486–87 (quoting Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of 
W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997)).  
32 Id. at 487. 
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method of speech.33 Imposing such a burden on that type of 
speech demands particular constitutional protection because it 
is “the most effective, fundamental, and perhaps economical 
avenue of political discourse.”34 Similarly, leafleting in support 
of controversial viewpoints is the “essence of First 
Amendment expression.”35  Accordingly, “[n]o form of speech 
is entitled to greater constitutional protection.”36 In sum, the 
Court concluded that government-imposed burdens on one-on-
one communication, such as those imposed by the 
Massachusetts statute, implicated particularly significant First 
Amendment concerns.37 
 
Moreover, the Massachusetts buffer zones carved out “a 
significant portion of the adjacent public sidewalks” and 
required the counselors to stand “well back” from the clinic.38 
The Court identified “uncontradicted testimony” that showed 
the buffer zones prohibited McCullen and her colleagues from 
effectively engaging in sidewalk counseling either verbally or 
by handing literature to the patients.39 As a result, the zones 
significantly impacted McCullen’s ministry.40 McCullen 
estimated that she had been able to persuade eighty women to 
refrain from having abortions since the Act was amended to 
create the thirty-five foot buffer zone, but that this figure was 
“far fewer people” than she previously reached.41 Jean Zarella, 
                                              
33 Id. at 488 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988)). 
34 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Meyer, 486 
U.S. at 424)). 
35 Id. at 489 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 
(1995)). 
36 Id. at 489 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347); see also Schenk, 519 U.S. at 377 
(“Leafletting and commenting on matters of public concern 
are classic forms of speech that lie at the heart of the First 
Amendment.”). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 487. 
39 Id. at 487–88. 
40 Id. at 487. 
41 Id.  
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another petition in McCullen, described a far more dramatic 
affect of the Massachusetts  Act.  Before its passing, she stated 
that she had an estimated one-hundred “successful 
interactions.” After its enactment, the buffer zones prevented 
her from persuading a single patient. 42 
 
The Court in McCullen rejected the government’s 
contention that it had tried other approaches to address the 
hostile sidewalk protestors, but that such approaches were 
ineffective.  Instead, the Court concluded that “the 
Commonwealth [of Massachusetts had] too readily foregone 
options that could [have] serve[d] its interests just as well, 
without substantially burdening the kind of speech in which 
[the sidewalk counselors] wish[ed] to engage.”43 It noted that 
Massachusetts had not initiated criminal prosecutions for 
existing laws that the hostile protestors could have been 
construed to have violated.44 It also had not sought injunctions 
against the hostile group in the approximately twenty years 
leading up to the Act’s amendment. “In short,” the Court 
concluded, Massachusetts “ha[d] not shown that it seriously 
undertook to address the problem with less intrusive tools 
readily available to it. Nor ha[d] it shown that it considered 
different methods that other jurisdictions have found 
effective.”45 
 
Even though the District Court failed to fully appreciate 
the distinctions between McCullen and this case, the Court here 
did fully appreciate the extent to which McCullen should 
inform its inquiry into the constitutionality of the Ordinance. 
The background giving rise to the buffer zone in Massachusetts 
and that which prompted the City of Englewood to enact the 
buffer zone here are similar. The competing interests are 
identical. Except for the size of the prescribed buffer zones, the 
text of the two legislative enactments is nearly the same. In 
fact, if the record here included uncontradicted facts similar to 
those on the record in McCullen, then the Court’s holding there 
would certainly dictate a similar outcome here. However, this 
record differs from the one in McCullen in two very important 
                                              
42 Id. at 487–88. 
43 Id. at 490. 
44 Id. at 494.  
45 Id. 
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ways. First, the buffer zones’ exact impact on the sidewalk 
counselors’ speech and the concomitant efficacy of their 
attempts to communicate is unclear on this record.  Indeed, 
Turco admitted that she continued to speak with patients 
entering the clinic after the enactment of the buffer zones. At 
the very least, there is contradictory evidence regarding the 
extent to which the buffer zone prevented Turco from 
communicating her message as she wanted. Second, the 
record—properly viewed in the light most favorable to the 
City— established that the City considered and attempted to 
implement alternative means of regulating speech, and that the 
City did attempt to enforce existing laws before creating the 
buffer zone. Those measures failed. Accordingly, we cannot 
agree that Turco was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
A. The Buffer Zones’ Impact on “Sidewalk Counselors.” 
 
During discovery, Turco agreed that she could talk “to 
patients on some kind of regular basis both before and after 
[the] adoption of the buffer zone ordinance.”46 But she also 
stated that navigating the buffer zones was akin to traversing 
an “obstacle course.”47 Nevertheless, Turco testified that she 
was able to walk from one side of the entrance to the other,48 
even though an occasional snow bank or parked car sometimes 
imposed difficulties.49 
 
Similarly, Rosemary Garrett, who also refers to herself 
as “a sidewalk counselor,” testified that she was still able to 
help women even after the buffer zones were implemented.50 
Specifically, she stated in her deposition that she “wasn’t 
bothered by the new buffer zone” because it did not affect her 
ministry.51  In fact, she stated that her counseling efforts were 
thwarted only when the hostile protestors began “yelling and 
screaming” and displaying “disturbing pictures.”52 When that 
happened, the women began running into the clinic to avoid 
                                              
46 JA 222–23.  
47 JA 224. 
48 JA 224. 
49 JA 225. 
50 JA 135. 
51 JA 134. 
52 JA 135–36. 
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the protests, which prevented the sidewalk counselors from 
approaching the women and offering help.53 According to 
Garrett, it was the “aggressive” actions of the anti-abortion 
protestors—not the buffer zones—that lead her to stand at the 
far corner from the entrance of the facility in order to conduct 
her ministry.54  
 
Thus, on this record, we cannot say that the eight-foot 
buffer zone imposed an inappropriate burden on speech as a 
matter of law. Moreover, such a conclusion would be directly 
at odds with the Supreme Court’s decision in Hill v. 
Colorado.55 There, the Court considered whether a Colorado 
statute that regulated speech within 100 feet of a health care 
facility violated the First Amendment. Specifically, the statute 
made it “unlawful within the regulated areas for any person to 
‘knowingly approach’ within eight feet of another person, 
without that person’s consent, ‘for the purpose of passing a 
leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral 
protest, education, or counseling with such other person.”56 
The statute made it “more difficult [for sidewalk counselors] 
to give unwanted advice, particularly in the form of a handbill 
or leaflet, to persons entering or leaving medical facilities.”57 
 
Some of those who referred to themselves as “sidewalk 
counselors” sued Colorado, alleging that the statute violated 
the First Amendment. After the Colorado state courts denied 
the challenge, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
 
As in McCullen, the Court began its analysis by 
discussing the interests at stake, finding that the plaintiffs’ 
“First Amendment interests . . . [were] clear and undisputed” 
because, inter alia, “the public sidewalks, streets, and ways 
affected by the statute [were] ‘quintessential’ public forums for 
                                              
53 JA 135, 137. 
54 JA 137–38.  
55 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
56 Hill, 530 U.S. at 707 (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-
122(3) (1999)).  
57 Id. at 708. 
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free speech” and the plaintiffs’ ability to communicate was 
“unquestionably lessened” by the Colorado statute.58  
 
Concomitantly, the Court noted that the state had an 
interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens, which 
“may justify a special focus on unimpeded access to health care 
facilities and the avoidance of potential trauma to patients 
associated with confrontational protests.”59 Moreover, the 
Court noted that “rules that provide specific guidance to 
enforcement authorities serve the interest in evenhanded 
application of the law.”60 Finally, the Court found that it was 
important to distinguish between “state restrictions on a 
speaker’s right to address a willing audience and those 
[restrictions] that protect listeners from unwanted 
communication.”61 It noted that the First Amendment 
protected a speaker’s “right to attempt to persuade others to 
change their views,” but “the protection afforded to offensive 
messages does not always embrace offensive speech that is so 
intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid it.”62 The 
Court explained the reasonableness and necessity for the eight 
foot buffer zone as follows: 
The statute seeks to protect those 
who wish to enter health care 
facilities, many of whom may be 
under special physical or 
emotional stress, from close 
physical approaches by 
demonstrators . . . . [T]he statute’s 
prophylactic aspect is justified by 
the great difficulty of protecting, 
say, a pregnant woman from 
physical harassment with legal 
rules that focus exclusively on the 
individual impact of each instance 
of behavior, demanding in each 
case an accurate characterization 
                                              
58 Id. at 714–15.  
59 Id. at 715 (citation omitted) (citing Madsen, 512 U.S. at 
753). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 715–16. 
62 Id. at 716 (citation omitted). 
16 
 
(as harassing or not harassing) of 
each individual movement within 
the 8-foot boundary. Such 
individualized characterization of 
each individual movement is often 
difficult to make accurately. . . . 
[T]he 8-foot restriction on an 
unwanted physical approach 
leaves ample room to 
communicate a message through 
speech. Signs, pictures, and voice 
itself can cross an 8-foot gap with 
ease.63 
 
Given the record in Hill, the statute satisfied the Court’s 
narrow tailoring analysis.  It found that the eight-foot buffer 
zone between speakers and passersby did not greatly affect 
communications.64 Clinic patients were still able to read 
signs,65 sidewalk counselors could conduct conversations in a 
normal tone,66 and the buffer zone allowed a leafleteer to stand 
“near the path of oncoming pedestrians [while] proffering his 
or her material, which the pedestrians [could] easily accept.”67  
The District Court did not explain why the eight-foot buffer 
zone here was unconstitutional despite the Supreme Court’s 
conclusion that the eight-foot buffer zone in Hill passed 
constitutional muster.  In fact, the District Court did not even 
cite Hill.  
 
                                              
63 Id. at 729 
64 Id. at 726. 
65 Id. (“The 8-foot separation between the speaker and the 
audience should not have any adverse impact on the readers’ 
ability to read signs displayed by demonstrators.”). 
66 Id. at 726–27 (“[T]his 8-foot zone allows the speaker to 
communicate at a ‘normal conversational distance.’” (quoting 
Schenk, 519 U.S. at 377)). 
67 Id. at 727. The Court allowed that the “8-foot interval could 
hinder the ability of a leafletter to deliver handbills to some 
unwilling recipients.” Id. Ultimately, it found that the 
Colorado restriction adequately protected the rights of the 
counselors to convey their message. 
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Given the Court’s analysis in Hill, we simply cannot 
conclude that the eight-foot buffer zones established under the 
Ordinance posed a severe burden on speech, and the record is 
clearly inadequate to support such a conclusion as a matter of 
law.  Rather, we conclude that there are material issues of 
genuine fact regarding the extent to which Turco retained the 
ability to communicate despite enactment of the eight-foot 
buffer zone.  
B. Less Restrictive Alternatives. 
 
We also disagree with the District Court’s conclusion 
that the record shows that the City failed to consider less 
restrictive means of regulating speech in front of the clinic. To 
be sure, the District Court was clearly correct when it found 
that the City had not “prosecute[d] any protestors for activities 
taking place on the sidewalk” and “did not seek injunctive 
relief against individuals whose conduct was the impetus for 
the Ordinance.”68 Those facts are not disputed. 
 
However, the City and its representatives explained that 
it had attempted to increase police presence at the Clinic, had 
considered alternative means of bringing order to the sidewalk, 
and proffered reasonable explanations for why those and other 
means were ineffective. The former Chief of Police, Arthur 
O’Keefe, testified that, given the limitations of “manpower” 
and the need to be able to deploy officers in response to 
emergencies such as drive-by shootings, it was not feasible to 
permanently provide a significantly increased police presence 
at the clinic.69 He also stated that some off-duty officers 
worked at the clinic, but that the police department had “finite 
resources” and much of it was devoted to violent crime.70 
Accordingly, he could not “simply dedicate an officer four 
hours at a time every day to enhance their security.”71  
During her deposition, Lynn Algrant, the President of 
Englewood City Council, testified extensively about the 
alternative means that the Council considered and why they 
were ineffective. She stated that the City had attempted to 
                                              
68 Turco, 2017 WL 5479509, at *5. 
69 JA 207. 
70 JA 207. 
71 Id. 
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increase police presence at the clinic on a volunteer basis, but 
officers were not signing-up for any shifts.72 She also testified 
that, despite manpower restrictions, on-duty officers were 
regularly dispatched to the clinic, but the hostile protests would 
resume as soon as the officers left.73 Algrant said that she 
encouraged the clinic to seek an injunction or file criminal 
complaints, but those efforts were hampered because the clinic 
escorts feared for their safety.74 She recalled occasions where 
clinic escorts were so frightened that they became 
“hysterical,”75 yet they still refused to file complaints because 
of the threat of retaliation from the hostile protestors. The 
safety concerns were not unwarranted. One of the women at 
the clinic found a picture of herself on the internet inside of a 
bullseye, and as a result, the clinic escorts “were extremely 
protective of their privacy and extremely protective for their 
safety.”76 
 
Timothy Dacey, the City Manager for Englewood, 
supported Algrant’s testimony. He believed that “it [would 
have been] cost prohibitive for [the City] to provide security 
for the clinic.”77 Dacey also stated that the police department’s 
policy prohibited them from providing individual security 
coverage to private businesses.78 He also testified that an 
increase in police patrols in the area were ineffective, and that 
the clinic escorts were too fearful to make complaints.79 Chief 
O’Keefe confirmed this in his testimony, stating that some of 
the targets of the protestors’ ire gave their names, but “many 
other people that were involved in incidents did not” because 
they were “concerned about subsequent identification or . . . 
were emotionally too distraught to become involved further.”80 
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This fear was also borne out by the deposition testimony 
from clinic escorts and through e-mails between the escorts and 
City officials. One clinic escort testified that “antiabortion 
groups [were] notorious for finding out people’s personal 
information, whether patients or abortion providers or escorts” 
and using it to further target their acts of harassment.81 She 
stated that her colleagues “have had antiabortion protesters 
show up at their place of work, their houses, [and] put their 
phone numbers and addresses and personal information and 
photos on websites.”82 As a result, the clinic escorts were “very 
careful to not let the protestors get any of our personal 
information” and used nicknames for each other while 
conversing on the sidewalk.83 The sidewalk escort testified that 
she was concerned about the Bread of Life’s apparent 
affiliation with a “fringe antiabortion group[],” Abolish 
Human Abortion.84 That group was itself aligned with 
“domestic terrorists” and “clinic bombers.”85 She also testified 
that the Bread of Life protestors were aligned with “Operation 
Rescue” a group that also aligned itself “with clinic bombers 
and celebrate[d] the murders of abortion doctors.”86 
  
That same clinic escort submitted a certification which 
included as exhibits several detailed accounts of the chaotic 
sidewalk environment that had developed outside of the 
clinic.87 She noted that the Bread of Life protestors filmed the 
patients’ license plates when they parked their cars, but she was 
unsure what they did with the information.88 She also stated 
that the hostile protests had escalated to a point that included 
“repeated physical assaults of escorts.”89  
  
In summary, the testimony of the various stakeholders 
when properly viewed in the light most favorable to the City 
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demonstrated that the City considered alternative means of 
restricting speech around the clinic. A jury could find that 
financial restraints and fear of reprisal prevented these 
measures from being effective. We therefore hold that this 
record was not appropriate for summary judgment. 
C. Our Decision in Bruni. 
 
Our decision here is consistent with our earlier decision 
in Bruni.90  There, we considered whether a Pittsburgh 
Ordinance that established fifteen-foot buffer zones around all 
health care facilities violated the First Amendment. That 
ordinance read: 
No person or persons shall 
knowingly congregate, patrol, 
picket or demonstrate in a zone 
extending fifteen (15) feet from 
any entrance to the hospital and or 
health care facility. This section 
shall not apply to police and public 
safety officers, fire and rescue 
personnel, or other emergency 
workers in the course of their 
official business, or to authorized 
security personnel employees or 
agents of the hospital, medical 
office or clinic engaged in 
assisting patients and other 
persons to enter or exit the 
hospital, medical office, or 
clinic.91  
 
We noted that, on its face, this statute applied to all hospitals 
and health care facilities in Pittsburgh.92 However, the City had 
only ever demarcated two buffer zones, both in front of 
facilities that provided abortion services.93  A group of persons 
who wanted to communicate with women entering the clinics 
sued the City of Pittsburgh, claiming that the ordinance 
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violated the First Amendment.94 They also sought a 
preliminary injunction.95 Following a hearing on the 
injunction, the District Court granted Pittsburgh’s motion to 
dismiss the complaint. The plaintiffs appealed and we 
reversed. 
  
We held that the District Court erred by dismissing the 
plaintiffs’ complaint and remanded for further factual 
development. Specifically, we found that allegations in the 
complaint suggested that the burden imposed on speech was 
akin to that in McCullen.96 The plaintiffs alleged that the buffer 
zone prevented them from reaching their intended audience 
and made conversations with the clinic’s patients much more 
difficult.97 Because the case was still at the pleading stage, 
those allegations were sufficient to require the government to 
prove “either that substantially less-restrictive alternatives 
were tried and failed, or that the alternatives were closely 
examined and ruled out for good reason.”98 We noted that 
Pittsburgh could not simply forego the range of alternatives 
available to it “without a meaningful record demonstrating that 
those options would fail to alleviate the problems meant to be 
addressed.”99 Finally, Bruni emphasized the “rigorous and 
fact-intensive nature of intermediate scrutiny’s narrow-
tailoring analysis,” and cautioned that the facts developed as 
the proceedings commenced would ultimately decide whether 
the restriction was justified.100 
  
Although Bruni arose at the pleading stage and the case 
before us was resolved through a motion for summary 
judgment, Bruni is instructive because it highlights the 
intensely factual nature of the inquiry that is usually needed to 
resolve disputes arising from imposition of buffer zones such 
as this one. We emphasized that “the constitutionality of buffer 
zone laws turns on the factual circumstances giving rise to the 
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law in each individual case—the same type of buffer zone may 
be upheld on one record where it might be struck down on 
another.”101  
 
This record contains a multitude of contradicting factual 
assertions. Some facts suggest that the buffer zones imposed a 
significant restraint on the plaintiff’s ability to engage in 
constitutionally-protected communication. Others support 
Englewood’s position that the buffer zones hardly affected 
plaintiff’s ability to reach her intended audience. Some facts 
support plaintiff’s argument that the City had foregone less-
restrictive options to address the chaotic environment outside 
of the clinic. Others show that Englewood considered these 
options and reasonably rejected them or found them to be 
ineffective.102 In short, the record does not conclusively 
demonstrate that either party is entitled to summary judgment 
on the narrow tailoring claim. 
D. Overbreadth. 
  
We also find that the District Court erred in finding that the 
ordinance was overbroad. Englewood correctly argues that the 
District Court’s reliance on McCullen was misplaced. There, 
the Supreme Court explicitly stated that it did not “need [to] 
consider [the] petitioners’ overbreadth challenge” because it 
found that Massachusetts’s statute was not narrowly 
tailored.103 In relying on McCullen, the District Court seems to 
have conflated the narrow-tailoring analysis with the 
overbreadth analysis.104 To support its conclusion that the 
Ordinance was overbroad, the District Court stated: “To meet 
the narrowly-tailored requirement, Defendant must create an 
Ordinance that targets the exact wrong it seeks to remedy.”105 
                                              
101 Id. at 357. 
102 Turco characterized the “the unwillingness of witnesses to 
come forward with complaints about criminal behavior [as] . . 
. preeminently a matter of factual dispute” in her pleadings. 
(Docket #45, 10).  
103 McCullen, 573 U.S. at 496 n.9. 
104 JA 11. 
105 JA 11 (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) 
(“A statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no 
more than the exact source of the evil it seeks to remedy.”)). 
 
23 
 
Although overbreadth and narrow tailoring are related,106 the 
Supreme Court has rejected the District Court’s assertion that 
an Ordinance must precisely target the acts it was passed to 
remedy.107 
  
In Hill, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he fact that the 
coverage of a statute is broader than the specific concern that 
led to its enactment is of no constitutional significance. What 
is important is that all persons entering or leaving health care 
facilities share the interests served by the statute.”108 When a 
buffer zone broadly applies to health care facilities, we may 
conclude “the comprehensiveness of the statute is a virtue, not 
a vice, because it is evidence against there being a 
discriminatory governmental motive.”109   
 
Bruni also discussed the plaintiffs’ allegation that the 
statute was overbroad because it authorized creation of buffer 
zones at non-abortion related locations.110 We declined to find 
that the ordinance was facially unconstitutional without further 
development in the record. We reiterated the Supreme Court’s 
admonition in Hill that the comprehensiveness of a statute 
demonstrates a lack of discriminatory motive and is not 
constitutionally determinative.111 Ultimately, in Bruni we 
concluded that we could not assess the breadth of the ordinance 
absent a “well-supported conclusion” about how widely it 
swept.112 We also reiterated the “broad principle of deference 
to legislative judgments” and that a legislative body “need not 
meticulously vet every less burdensome alternative.”113 This 
principle is well-established in First Amendment 
jurisprudence, and we are mindful of our duty to “accord a 
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measure of deference to the judgment” of Englewood city 
council.114 
  
We conclude that the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment because the ordinance was not overbroad. 
Courts may not strike down a regulation as “overbroad unless 
the overbreadth is substantial in relation to the [regulation’s] 
plainly legitimate sweep.”115 The Supreme Court has 
“vigorously enforced the requirement that a statute’s 
overbreadth be substantial.”116 The hesitation to label a statute 
overbroad arises from a court’s need to strike a balance 
between competing social costs: 
On the one hand, the threat of 
enforcement of an overbroad law 
deters people from engaging in 
constitutionally protected speech, 
inhibiting the free exchange of 
ideas. On the other hand, 
invalidating a law that in some of 
its applications is perfectly 
constitutional . . . has obvious 
harmful effects.”117  
 
“In determining whether a statute’s overbreadth is substantial, 
we consider a statute’s application to real-world conduct, not 
fanciful hypotheticals.”118 “[T]he overbreadth claimant bears 
the burden of demonstrating, ‘from the text of [the law], and 
from actual fact,’ that substantial overbreadth exists.”119  
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The same concern is present here. The record is 
essentially devoid of any factual development concerning the 
“legitimate sweep” of the buffer zones. We therefore “think it 
unwise for us to assess the proper scope of the City’s 
Ordinance without there first being a resolution of the merits 
of the Plaintiffs’ free speech claim.”120 Accordingly, we will 
also reverse the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on 
grounds that the statute was overbroad.  
 
III. 
  
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment is hereby reversed, and the case remanded 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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